CHAPTER XII
EFFECTIVE HISTORY AND THE DISTINCTION
BETWEEN HISTORICAL AND DOGMATIC TRADITION

Although the terminology, historical and dogmatic tradition, was not expressly employed until the period just before the declaration of the bodily assumption of Mary into heaven, nevertheless the point of the distinction between the two has been well known since at least the time of the modernist controversy. Historical tradition, on the one hand, refers to the truths of Christianity which can be traced back to Christ and the apostles by historical documentation. The principal source of this testimony is the New Testament, despite the common objection that many words and deeds ascribed to Jesus and the twelve are the creation of post-apostolic generations. Dogmatic tradition, on the other hand, refers to revealed truths whose apostolic origins cannot be verified by historical documentation extending back to the first century. Particular examples of dogmatic tradition, apart from the tradition of Mary’s assumption, include the efficacy of prayer for the dead, the worth of infant baptism, and the validity of baptism by heretics, to which we shall return in a moment. The distinction between historical and dogmatic tradition illuminates what can now be identified as the three epistemological questions raised by the theology of tradition: first, what are the criteria for evaluating the authenticity of Christian traditions? Second, what does the establishment of such criteria presuppose? Third, what are the limits of our ability to inquire about such presuppositions?

The first question, that of the juridical criteria for Christian tradition, has already been answered in our discussion of active and objective tradition. The doctrine taught by the magisterium is not independent of tradition, as we saw, and while the teaching of the magisterium must be interpreted within the whole of Christian tradition, nevertheless it does demand the assent of the faithful. To this issue the distinction between historical and dogmatic tradition adds an insight into the working of magisterial authority. Why should one believe the dogmatic definitions of the magisterium when historical documentation of the first-century origins of a particular dogma are lacking? John Henry Newman suggested an answer. In 1839, while still an Anglican, he read an article by the Catholic priest and theologian, Nicholas Wiseman, critical of the Church of England’s claim that it stands within an ecclesiastical tradition going back to apostolic times. In the article, Wiseman referred to St. Augustine’s conflict with the Donatists, named after the fourth-century Bishop of Carthage, Donatus, who held that the validity of the

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1 See above, A Reconsideration of the Modern Theology of Tradition, esp. the section entitled “Historical and Dogmatic Tradition.”

2 Congar (I.64-76; trans., pp. 50-64) provides extensive examples of unwritten traditions and their later documentation.

sacraments depends on the spiritual state of the minister. In the Donatist view, the
validity of baptism by a heretic is not a part of apostolic teaching, and so cannot be called
Christian tradition. Augustine wrote a number of works against the Donatists, among
which was a reply to the writings of one Parmenianus, who had alleged that only the pure
church in Africa of the Donatists – which had been condemned in 314 at the Council of
Arles – could be called holy.

Wiseman quoted from Augustine’s Contra Epistulam Parmenian a sentence
which made a profound impact on Newman. Augustine said that, when the entire
Catholic world judges that those who separate themselves from it (wherever in the world
they might be) are not good, then that judgment is secure. The Donatist church may
have been composed of exemplary individuals, and they may have been able to make a
case that the validity of baptism by a heretic is not a part of apostolic tradition. But the
judgment of the orb of the Catholic world, as Augustine put it, could not be brooked.
“The words of St. Augustine,” Newman wrote, “struck me with a power which I never
had felt from any words before.” For the controversy of the fourth century, the
Augustinian text suggested merely that, while there may be no documentary evidence
from apostolic times attesting to the validity of baptism by a heretic, such evidence could
not be the last word. But for Newman, Augustine’s words had far wider ramifications.
They meant that the Church of England’s claim that it stands upon traditions of the
greatest antiquity was not absolute. Augustine was himself a voice from antiquity, and he
acknowledged another criterion. When documentary evidence for the apostolic origin of
a tradition is lacking, one can rely on the judgment of the whole Church as the extension
in history of the body of Christ. It alone draws the correct implications from the
testimony of antiquity. This thinking is the basis for the Catholic doctrine of magisterial

4 Geoffrey Grimshaw Willis, Saint Augustine and the Donatist Controversy (London: S.

5 “[Q]uapropter securus iudicat orbis terrarum bonos non esse, qui se diuidunt ab orbe
terrarum in quamque parte terrarum.” Augustine, Contra Epistulam Parmenian, book III,
chap. iv, par. 24, in Sancti Aureli Augustini Opera, ed. M. Petschenig, section 7, part 1:
1908), vol. 51 of the series Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum, begun in
1866, now edited by Austrian Academy of Sciences, 88 vols. to date (Vienna: Hoelder-
Pichler-Tempsky, 1981). It is clear in context that the orb of the world to which
Augustine refers is the Catholic world, whose center is Rome.

6 Newman, Apologia, p. 110.

7 In this way dogmatic tradition must be distinguished from oral tradition independent of
Scripture. The dogmatic tradition includes the implications, and not just the explicit
propositions, contained in the teachings of Jesus and the twelve. See J. P. Mackey,
For a Protestant criticism of Catholic tradition defined as explicit oral teaching,
independent of the Bible, which has survived from the first century, see R. P. C. Hanson,
(and especially papal) infallibility, without which the epistemological question of the criteria for authentic Christian tradition cannot be answered.

Let us rephrase the point which Newman drew from Augustine in terms of historical and dogmatic tradition. Catholic theology subordinates historical tradition to its dogmatic counterpart because the latter is a living tradition. Unlike historical tradition, defined as that which has been transmitted from the past solely in documentary fashion, dogmatic tradition reveals itself in the life of the entire Church. The distinction between historical and dogmatic tradition brings us to a second epistemological question. This is the question of the presuppositions behind the distinction. The first presupposition is that tradition cannot be reduced to the documentary evidence which testifies to it. In a living tradition not everything needs to be written. Such a

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8 The solemn definition of papal infallibility in 1870, which insisted that ex cathedra teachings are unalterable not because of the consensus of the Church (Enchiridion Symbolorum, par. 1839; trans., p. 457), is misunderstood if regarded as a contradiction of Augustine’s word against the Donatists: it is rather the duty of the pope to speak authoritatively for the orb of the Catholic world. The relation between the magisterium and the papacy, however, is too complex to be explored here. Hans Küng reawakened the question for Catholic theology in 1970 with his Unfehlar? Eine Anfrage (Zürich, Einsiedeln, Cologne: Benziger, 1970); translation: Infallible? An Inquiry, trans. Edward Quinn (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 11971). This was answered by a collection of essays by leading continental theologians entitled Zum Problem Unfehlbarkeit. Antworten auf die Anfrage von Hans Küng (ed. Karl Rahner, vol. 54 of the series Quaestiones disputatae (Freiburg, Basel, Vienna: Herder, 1971)). This in turn provoked Fehlbar? Eine Bilanz, ed. Hans Kung (Zurich, Einsiedeln, Cologne: Benziger, 1973).

The dispute over Kung’s Infallible? has brought forward a large number of further studies. The most important in English, from a systematic viewpoint, is Chirico’s Infallibility: The Crossroads of Doctrine, to which we have already referred. The most recent is Papal Infallibility: An Application of Lonergan’s Theological Method, ed. Terry J. Tekippe (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, Inc., 1983).


presupposition, which reacts to the historicist thesis that the past is adequately interpreted within the context which historical materials themselves provide, can lead to erroneous conclusions. One thinks of the immanentism of the Modernists.\textsuperscript{10} According to this aspect of modernist thought, the content of Christian tradition exists independently of its origin in the teachings of Christ and the apostles. Tradition is immanent within the Christian, according to the modernist view, as a focus of the individual religious life which springs from the heart, rather than from a transcendent first century event. In order to accommodate the position of historical critics, who allege that much of what passes for apostolic tradition is of a much later date, modernist thought divorced the meaning of Catholic doctrine from its origin. With the theologians of tradition, the modernists refused to insist that an authentic apostolic tradition required first-century documentation.

But Catholic theology could not accept the modernist theory of a purely immanent Christian tradition. In addition, then, to the first presupposition implicit in the distinction between historical and dogmatic tradition — that tradition exceeds the power of documents to encompass and express it — one can detect a second presupposition. This can be expressed in a seemingly paradoxical formulation: although dogmatic tradition is distinct from historical tradition, it is nevertheless historical. The paradox is dissolved in the reflection that history is more than the historical record. The absence of first century documentation for many dogmatic traditions does not disprove their first-century origin. The theologians of tradition presupposed that a matter approved as part of the deposit of faith by ecclesiastical consensus must have originated with the apostles, at least in an implicit way.\textsuperscript{11} This second presupposition, like the first, had its extreme advocates. Such were those whom Maurice Blondel named extrinsicists.\textsuperscript{12} They regarded the dogmatic importance of historical events as extrinsic to history, the investigation of which could reveal only what the Church already knew. Historical events merely express in a contingent fashion the absolute truths of dogma, according to the extrinsicist view, and the historical documentation of those truths distracts the inquirer from attending to their supernatural character. If it can be said that immanentism was an effort to accommodate historical criticism, extrinsicism was an effort to prove its irrelevance. Both movements feared the consequences of historical investigation for faith. But implicit in the distinction between historical and dogmatic tradition are the two historical presuppositions of Catholic theology: first, that the consensus of the Church attests to the apostolic origins of tradition; and second, that such tradition cannot be adequately derived from the documentary record.

Hence we can see that Catholic theology sought to chart a middle course between those who indiscriminately accepted the historical criticism of the claim of apostolic origins for Christian tradition and those who dismissed the importance of such criticism.

\textsuperscript{10} See above \textit{A Reconsideration of the Modern Theology of Tradition}, esp. the section entitled “Historicism and Immanehtanism.”

\textsuperscript{11} Ibid., esp. the section entitled “Historical Tradition Is Still Tradition.”

\textsuperscript{12} Ibid., esp. the section entitled “The Critique of the Right.”
The distinction between historical and dogmatic tradition aims to account for both extremes. In response to the immanentists and historical critics, skeptical of the apostolicity of Catholic tradition, the distinction implied that a documentary notion of tradition is inadequate. To the extrinsicists, for whom the historical origins of sacred doctrine were a matter of indifference, the distinction emphasized that dogmatic tradition is still tradition, that is, doctrine passed down from Christ and the apostles. In short, the distinction presupposes a concept of history which is not historicist and an ontology of faith which is not purely supernatural. That much, at least, can be concluded from a study of the genesis of the distinction.

To lay out the presuppositions implicit in the distinction between historical and dogmatic tradition is not, however, to make the distinction fully transparent. One lays out only what one understands. There are limits to that understanding of Christian tradition which have not been clearly drawn. The acknowledgment of such limits brings us to the third epistemological question raised by the theology of tradition, that of the human capacity to inquire about historical presuppositions. To what degree can one give a historical justification for tradition? The distinction between history and dogma raises this question in an indirect way. It affirms, on the one hand, that we meet in the faith of the Church a dogmatic tradition which cannot be fully justified outside the Church by an independent historical method. While Christian tradition originated in a revelation at a particular historical moment, a study of that history does not compel allegiance to the tradition. The borders of the Church’s own tradition seem to limit the Christian’s capacity to verify it. On the other hand, the fact that dogmatic traditions are anchored in historical events suggests that there is no a priori limit to the documentation and verifiability of such traditions. One cannot draw a line beyond which the investigator of Christian tradition enters a purely supernatural realm. The limits to the scientific establishment of the fundamental facts of revelation and tradition apparently break down as soon as they are acknowledged. How is the Christian to understand the relation between dogmatic tradition, for which outside the Church no justification can suffice, and historical tradition, which (although indispensable to the Church) cannot by itself lead to faith? This is the question of the penetrability of tradition. Upon it the philosophical rehabilitation of tradition sheds a light.

XII.1. The Threat of Immanentism and Extrinsicism

The first two of the three figures central to the philosophical rehabilitation of tradition, Hegel and Heidegger, complement one another in their treatment of history. Hegel was convinced that human consciousness could penetrate history, discover in it the traces of spirit, and reconcile itself to it. His work enables an understanding of how the contingent events of first-century history manifest the absolute. In Hegel, however, there is also an immanentism which regards the absolute not as that in which humanity dwells, but as that which humanity encompasses. Heidegger, on the other hand, insisted that history or destiny is the impenetrable origin of human possibility. Heidegger’s thought suggests the limits to understanding a tradition which itself defines the context of that understanding. To this extent he submits a potent critique of historicism. Yet the Heideggerian concept of a being which is irreducible to beings flirts, some would say, with extrinsicism. It tends to devalue the particular in relation to the universal. Hegel
and Heidegger, one can generalize, represent opposite tendencies in this matter. Hegel’s thought emphasizes the intelligibility of tradition. Heidegger suggests that tradition transcends the human ability to fully thematize it. Both thinkers can be oriented toward the opposing halves of the distinction between historical and dogmatic tradition. And both threaten the distinction with the extremes of immanentism and extrinsicism. Let us look in turn at each thinker’s relation to the distinction which is our theme.

XII.1.A. Hegel’s Immanent Method

Hegel’s indirect contribution to our understanding of the distinction between historical and dogmatic tradition lies in his doctrines of the rationality of history, the synthetic power of dialectic, and the correspondence between being and thought. Through these doctrines he suggested the penetrability of tradition, that is, the human capacity to grasp in tradition the tradition’s own historical roots. The rationality of history, first of all, by which phrase Hegel meant that the diversity of historical phenomena testify to a single human spirit, signifies the assumption that history is intelligible. Whoever would argue that dogmatic tradition cannot be understood as history would have to answer Hegel. Secondly, the synthetic power of the Hegelian dialectic suggests how tradition is to be understood. When confronted by the alien thought of the past, which appears to contradict one’s own presuppositions, the dialectical thinker grasps both movements, the presupposition and the alien thought, synthesizing them in a context which encompasses both. Dogmatic and historical tradition, which seem to clash when the historical record does not clearly substantiate the Church’s faith, may be reconciled by the insight that tradition is more than documentation. Finally, Hegel’s assertion of the correspondence between being and thought provides a rationale for the penetrability of tradition. All being, especially tradition as the being of the past, reveals the thought which is its source and can be grasped by thought. While Hegel’s dictum does not suggest that all dogmatic tradition is rooted in first-century history, it does teach that such dogma testifies to the work of the human spirit in history, and ought to be understood in historical terms. The Hegelian doctrines deny, in short, the elevation of dogmatic tradition to an extra-historical realm.

But at the same time, one can detect in Hegel the philosophic roots of the immanentism which found its theological expression in modernism. The origin of this kind of thinking can be seen in the Hegelian philosophies of art and history. According to the philosophy of art, every artistic expression manifests the human spirit, and so every epoch of art history possesses a permanent validity. If this is so, how then can one achieve an integrated understanding of art, i.e., subsume a given object under categories, ordering all artistic expressions within an over-arching view? History itself does not provide a fully-intelligible framework. It is the cunning of reason, according to Hegel, which subordinates all human constructs (of art, for example, or of philosophy) to its own ends. Given this problem, a certain kind of Hegelian thinker is tempted to regard the hierarchies of art and history as immanent to thought. Identifying his or her own thinking with the thought discernible in the structure of reality, such a Hegelian risks betraying the legitimate correspondence between being and thought, substituting in its place an imagined identity of the two. A denial of external being replaces the task of integrating and reconciling oneself to it.
In theological terms, the danger expresses itself in the tendency to regard dogmatic tradition as a mere symbol of a religious reality which is immanent. What was once understood as the history of God’s self-revelation in Jesus Christ, a revelation authoritatively transmitted by the apostles, could be reduced to the phenomena of consciousness. If the value of Christian origins consisted only in the richly suggestive imagery they provide to the imagination, then their being becomes merely phenomenal. It might appear as if the origins of Christianity, and indeed, all subsequent Christian history, serve only to awaken the religious impulse in humanity. But Catholic theology denies such a view. It insists rather, in the words of the encyclical “Pascendi,” on the inseparability of the divine and the human in Christianity. The origin of Christianity is not a matter of purely human history, but the entrance of the divine into history. Although some may draw from Hegel the conclusion that the divine element in the history of Jesus arises only in a subsequent reflection upon it, a truer conclusion would be that, in the Hegelian doctrines, one discovers an approach to the phenomena of Christianity which emphasizes the intelligibility of their origin. With Hegel, we can say that subsequent developments of dogmatic tradition, like later developments in art, do not make earlier forms superfluous or dispensable. Instead, history and dogma form a continuum.

XII.1.B. Heidegger’s Latent Extrinsicism

If Hegel insisted upon the penetrability or intelligibility of the past, Heidegger was preoccupied with historical being as that which resists facile penetration. Just as the nature of being cannot be reduced to one among other beings, so tradition cannot be understood apart from a situation which tradition has itself bestowed. To those tempted to equate tradition with the teachings of the magisterium, as if tradition were no more than that, the doctrine of Heidegger serves as a reproach. It brings to mind the contingent nature of magisterial teaching, recalling that the authoritative expositions of Christian tradition by the magisterium are themselves a part of tradition, in whose light they will be interpreted. Heidegger taught that time is not a thing within which events take place, but rather is the event itself in its temporal aspect. We can say by analogy that the dogmatic tradition in general is the temporal aspect of Christian dogma. From this stems the familiar conclusion that dogmatic tradition cannot be reduced to a documented historical tradition. Furthermore, one can conclude that historical tradition itself is more than can

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14 Enchiridion Symbolorun, esp. par. 2096; trans., The Sources of Catholic Dogma, p. 532.
be documented. In all of history, not just in the history of Christianity, something like the Heideggerian fate or destiny is effective.

Such an insight, drawn from Heidegger’s thesis that being is interpreted in the finite ways granted by time or the historical epoch of the interpreter, suggests that a particular kind of transcendental perspective is available to humanity. According to this perspective, the knowledge that one is being influenced in unknown ways by fate is an attainable kind of knowledge, but the ability to say what that influence is remains elusive. Expressed in this way, such a transcendental insight is unobjectionable. Doubtless one can acknowledge that one is a creature of the present, shaped by the forces of contemporary life, without pretending to have stepped out of the present in order to make the statement. And only an atheist would object to the assertion that individuals are thrown into a history of which God alone is lord. We readily acknowledge that history eludes our full understanding, and such an acknowledgment reveals a transcendental perspective.

But some have found fault with the implications of this transcendentalism. If in Heidegger’s ontology one can draw valid inferences about the meaning of being without reference to particular beings in which that meaning is grounded, then the threat of a certain theological extrinsicism may arise. The Heideggerian analysis of the call of conscience, for example, resists the tendency to assign the power of conscience to one among other beings. Such an assignation may suggest that the conscience is wholly alien (the call of God) or wholly subjective (a biological drive). By refusing the easy assignation, Heidegger preserves the conscience as a matter for thought. In an analogous way, one can understand the extrinsicist refusal to seek the basis of dogmatic tradition in history. Such a search might lead to the false conclusion that an understanding of the genesis of dogma suffices for an understanding of the dogma itself. The truth of extrinsicism, we can say, is that the value of dogmatic tradition does not rely upon the historical documentation of it.

Extrinsicism threatens, however, to sever the organic connection between dogma and history. To the extent that Heidegger shares the extrinsicist impulse – the impulse toward preserving the power of a particular form of being, such as the being of the conscience or the being of dogma, by refusing to ground it in other beings – he risks aiding those who would divorce belief from its historical roots. This is of particular concern for those Protestant theologians who see in Heidegger a philosophy of fate or of destiny. Such a philosophy, these critics say, could support a theology which emphasizes the incomprehensibility of divine action instead of the intelligibility of God’s word. One might infer from Heidegger that salvation is the irresistible momentum of preordained forces, rather than that which is achieved through faith in Jesus Christ as the historical self-revelation of God. These Protestant thinkers do not use the term extrinsicism. But
in their critique of Heidegger’s refusal to equate being with the historical beings in which it is manifest, we can see a parallel to the Catholic critique of the extrinsicist reduction of history to a mere accident. The danger of a transcendental perspective, whether in philosophy or theology, lies in the illusion that such a perspective enables one to overcome or dispense with history.

Nevertheless, it must be said that the extrinsicist impulse in Heidegger is more latent than manifest. Heidegger’s treatment of being scarcely can be said to parallel the extrinsicist treatment of dogma. The contribution of Heidegger to the understanding of historical and dogmatic tradition more importantly consists in his illumination of the nature of history. He saw that history is far more than historicism, the view that historical materials themselves provide a sufficient context for their own interpretation. Instead, the historian is always thrown into a situation which determines the historical materials at hand, Heidegger taught, and the understanding of those materials is always an anticipation of their value for the future. By analogy, we can say that the historical materials of the tradition do not provide a sufficient context for understanding dogma, which is always interpreted in terms of its anticipated importance. If Hegel’s genius lay in his grasp of history as the realm in which spirit is manifest, Heidegger’s genius gave birth to the insight that history is always more than can be derived from a documentary analysis. From this Heideggerian insight Gadamer drew his concept of effective history.

XII.2. Emancipation from and Substantiation of Prejudice

Gadamer’s effective history contributes to the distinction between historical and dogmatic tradition the realization that, in the understanding of tradition, tradition itself is unfolding. Just as, for Gadamer, history affects the historian in the form of prejudice (that is, in the self-evident prejudgments which are inevitably incorporated in scientific historiography), so we can say that tradition affects the interpreter of a dogmatic tradition. It does so in ways of which the interpreter is both aware and unaware. Those who profess an allegiance to the Catholic tradition know that such an allegiance has definite consequences. The Catholic interpreter will not understand the antithesis between faith and the works of the law in the Pauline corpus, for example, as a basis for arguing the superiority of Protestantism. Such an interpreter will not acknowledge that the references in the Synoptic Gospels to the brothers of Jesus exclude the possibility of the perpetual virginity of Mary. The Catholic will regard the prologue to John’s Gospel...
as the basis for the later dogmatic elaboration (but not distortion) of Christology. These are examples of the effect of tradition which the interpreter readily acknowledges.

Tradition is also effective in hidden ways. When one affirms this, one seems to be speaking from a transcendental perspective: tradition is hidden from some, it could be inferred, but not from the one who recognizes its hidden effectiveness. To affirm, however, that tradition affects us in ways we do not know is not to transcend the tradition. Such an affirmation only makes the illustration of effective history a nearly impossible task. It is one thing to admit that history has a hidden effectiveness, and quite another to say what that effect is. We have attempted to illustrate effective history with the choice of critical approaches to the Bible. History is effective, for example, in the widespread assumption that historical criticism is more acceptable than the so-called spiritual exegesis of Scripture. But this illustration of effective history does not perfectly succeed. It tends to suggest that such history, which in the sense we are discussing is by definition unknown, can indeed be known. This, in Gadamer’s view, is a false conclusion. His transcendental perspective, if it can be called that, entails only the insight that one can be aware in general that history is effective – not that we can be fully aware of what that effect is.

It is doubtless true that historical forces of which we are not aware can come to our attention. However, these forces then cease to be effective history in the precise sense we are discussing. Once we are aware of them, they are no longer unconscious prejudices. They can indeed be brought to the attention of others who do not yet recognize them. To this limited extent, one can be freed from prejudice. But the point of Gadamer’s analysis of effective history is that the revelation of unconscious prejudices happens rarely. For that reason he identifies such prejudices with the historical reality of our being. Rather than engaging in the vain effort to free oneself completely from prejudice, the Gadamerian insists that the presuppositions which govern an interpretation are precisely those which enable new dimensions of the interpreted reality to come to light. This is of consequence for what we have called Catholic hermeneutics. It suggests that the Catholic tradition entails an understanding which, while aspects of it emerge in what broadly can be called the Catholic interpretation of reality, nevertheless eludes a full thematization. The effective history of Catholicism, one can infer, works itself out in the individual Catholic in ways of which the individual is never fully aware. Without trying to be novel, the Catholic will interpret things differently from the non-Catholic, even in areas which are not normally considered the realm of religious polemic.

Such different interpretations illuminate previous interpretations. They do so by presenting a new view which is not adequately conveyed in the old. The one who adjudicates between the new and the old cannot simply approve the one and reject the other. Even when one view is judged preferable to the other, the other is not thereby

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17 See above The Philosophical Rehabilitation of Tradition, Chapter VII, esp. the section entitled “The Double Aspect.”

18 Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode, p. 261; trans., p. 245.
excluded from consideration. Rather, the one is approved despite the other, for which an account must be given. This is again the limited extent to which we can free ourselves from prejudice. Such emancipation occurs when an encounter reveals to us something of which we were not aware. In the adjudication between a new interpretation and an old, for example, we are presented with a choice which formerly we did not know existed. What had seemed unproblematical, at least to a previous frame of mind, suddenly becomes a problem. In the solution to the problem, a prejudice – if by that we can term an unexamined presupposition which conflicting interpretations have brought to light – comes to conscious attention. From that point on we can be aware of the particular presupposition, and guard ourselves from being blinded by it. This is what Gadamer means when he speaks of the fore-meanings whose spell has to be broken.\textsuperscript{19} But to break out of the spell of a presupposition does not necessarily entail abandoning the presupposition. One may have good reasons for maintaining it, in which case it becomes simply a supposition. Or one may recognize that the presupposition does not harmonize with one’s other beliefs, and so dismiss it as a false prejudice. In neither case, however, is there an opportunity for a complete freedom from prejudice. One can only free oneself from those particular prejudices which come to conscious attention.

This allows us to better understand the genesis of the distinction between historical and dogmatic tradition. The distinction arose, we can say, in response to the historical criticism of what Catholics alleged to be the first-century origins of dogma. Critics suggested that those dogmas, which cannot be traced back by documentary evidence to the teachings of Christ and the apostles, ought to be abandoned or understood as merely of immanent value. This critique posed as a problem the Catholic teaching that the dogmatic heritage is of apostolic origin. The Catholic world had to re-examine its presupposition of the apostolicity of dogma. The distinction between historical and dogmatic tradition represents the harvest of such a re-examination. By emphasizing that dogmatic tradition is more than a documentary record, Catholic theology blunted the historicist critique. And by emphasizing that dogmatic tradition remains tradition, even without an unambiguous documentary foundation, Catholic theology renewed its historical search in ancient documents for the latent roots of dogma. In sum, the historicist critique brought to Catholic consciousness the presuppositions which formerly had not been seen with such clarity. Among these was the false presupposition that the historiographic grounding of dogma by means of documentary analysis is of little importance. In the response to that critique, effective historical forces in Catholicism were put into play whose full consequence remains to be seen. Gadamer’s doctrine of effective history is a successful attempt to express both sides of this reality: the freeing of oneself from prejudice and the continuing domination of prejudice in the form of unacknowledged historical forces.

XII.2.A. Stobbe’s Distinction between Catholic Tradition and Effective History

The ability of Gadamer’s analysis to do justice both to the unexamined presuppositions which one’s standing in a tradition entails, and to the ways developed within a tradition for exposing prejudice, has not, however, met universal approval.

\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., pp. 252-253; trans., pp. 236-237.
Indeed, it has been criticized as self-contradictory. Heinz Gunther Stobbe’s 1981 *Hermeneutic – An Ecumenical Problem*, for example, refers to this contradiction as a consequence of Gadamer’s acknowledgment of the exemplary significance of Protestant hermeneutics. Although the Gadamerian rehabilitation of tradition seems to accord with the Catholic insistence on the importance of a dogmatic tradition, Stobbe argues that such a rehabilitation, aimed at tradition in general and not at Catholic tradition in particular, relativizes all tradition and so leads to a hermeneutical nihilism. Stobbe (b. 1948), a Catholic theologian at the University of Münster in Westphalia, regards Gadamer as an enemy of the Catholic principle of tradition. That principle, as Stobbe notes, serves as a criterion for the understanding of Scripture. Is Stobbe simply pointing to the ultimately authoritative (but not the only) means developed within the Catholic tradition for adjudicating exegetical disputes? Or is he suggesting that the magisterium, which judges whether a concrete interpretation of Scripture accords with the “sensus ecclesiasticus,” stands not only above exegesis but outside of history as well?

The largest part of Stobbe’s book is devoted to an extremely unsympathetic exposition of Gadamer. Stobbe begins by laying out what he considers the central Gadamerian contradiction, the thesis that one both can and cannot control prejudices. That one can control them, at least insofar as one recognizes them, is stated in the section of *Truth and Method* entitled “Heidegger’s disclosure of the fore-structure of understanding.” There Gadamer argues, with Heidegger, that right understanding stems not from ridding oneself of presuppositions. It emerges rather by deriving those presuppositions from, and checking them against, the matter to be understood.20 In apparent contrast to this, *Truth and Method* also states, in the section entitled “The hermeneutic significance of temporal distance,” that prejudices can never be fully controlled. They are the historical substance of our being. The presuppositions arising from a particular historical situation enable new aspects of a matter to come to conscious attention.21 Stobbe feels that the two Gadamerian assertions cannot be reconciled. “If one understands the demand to become conscious of prejudices as directed to the interpreting subject,” argues Stobbe, “then between the subject and the thesis that a conscious control of the interpreter’s prejudices is impossible there results a striking contradiction.”22 One cannot simultaneously ask, as Gadamer apparently does, that one free oneself from prejudice, and assert that a freedom from prejudice is impossible.


21 Ibid., pp. 275-283; trans., pp. 258-267.

The root of Gadamer’s self-contradiction lies, according to Stobbe, in the movement from a transcendental to a methodological reflection. Gadamer’s analysis can be called transcendental in that it seeks to inquire, not what the interpreter ought to do, but rather what always happens in interpretation, transcending the will of the interpreter.\(^{23}\) To this extent, Gadamer can even invoke the Kantian question of the conditions for the possibility of knowledge as a model. Yet Gadamer’s analysis is also methodological, at least insofar as it describes what the method of historical and hermeneutical consciousness requires.\(^{24}\) The description in Truth and Method of what always happens in interpretation presupposes a common understanding of exegetical practice. In Stobbe’s opinion, however, the priority which Gadamer assigns to transcendental analysis is belied by a surreptitious turn toward method. Gadamer cannot help but raise the methodological issue, Stobbe charges, for only in terms of method can Gadamer resolve the question of how one distinguishes true and false prejudices.\(^{25}\)

Stobbe does not object to the discussion by Gadamer of methodological issues. What irritates him is Gadamer’s professed lack of concern with such issues, and the inadequacy of the methodological guidelines which Gadamer implicitly proposes. In Stobbe’s view, the Gadamerian method for the humanities is itself contradictory. It affirms, on the one hand, that the objects to be interpreted are self defined and self-identical. The Gadamerian interpreter stands upon the general assumption that the intended meaning of a text is unambiguous. In the interpretive experience of anticipating a meaning, being frustrated in that anticipation, and forming new anticipations, the truth of a text asserts itself.\(^{26}\) On the other hand, Gadamer teaches that every understanding is different on account of the interpreter’s historical situation. The ideal of an interpretation which is correct in itself, Gadamer says, is foolish.\(^{27}\) Stobbe feels that Gadamer’s second teaching negates his first. The Gadamerian emphasis on the general unambiguity of authorial intention is subverted, in Stobbe’s view, by a transcendental analysis of how the interpreter’s grasp of the text is shaped by history.\(^{28}\) The history within which the interpreter understands the text is presented by Gadamer as so powerful that it determines what a society believes knowledge to be. The consequence of this, according to Stobbe, is relativism. Gadamer confuses understanding, which is contingent and relative, with


\(^{24}\) Ibid., p. 254; trans., p. 239.

\(^{25}\) Stobbe, Hermeneutik, p. 38.


\(^{27}\) Ibid., pp. 280, 375; trans., pp. 264,358.

\(^{28}\) Stobbe, Hermeneutik, p. 47.
genuine knowledge.\textsuperscript{29} Every aspect or mere appearance of a matter, Stobbe charges, is treated in Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics as equally true.

The secret basis of this perspectivalism, in Stobbe’s view, is Gadamer’s acceptance of the exemplary significance of Protestant hermeneutics. Gadamer criticizes Schleiermacher, we have seen, for attempting to create a universal hermeneutics, a method as applicable to the classics as to the Bible.\textsuperscript{30} The point of Gadamer’s critique is that Schleiermacher’s doctrine, which aimed at reconstructing the meaning of the ancient text as an object for scientific study (rather than integrating the ancient thought with present life), expressed a longing to remove the act of interpretation from the dogmatic constraints of authority such as the churches. The Schleiermacherian interpreter does not read the Bible as a medium of revelation which parallels the medium of dogmatic tradition. Instead, such an interpreter finds in the Biblical text a field for the play of imagination and a trace of the psychology of the ancient author – not the matter of revelation transmitted through the churches’ Biblical interpretations. This, in Gadamer’s view, prevents Schleiermacher’s universal hermeneutics from pursuing an interpretation of the Bible led by the matter itself of revelation.\textsuperscript{31} For that reason, Gadamer approves the critique of historicism by the Protestant theologians, Ernst Fuchs and Gerhard Ebeling. They have rightly seen, according to Gadamer, that the truth of the understanding of Scripture is not guaranteed by a historical method, but depends upon the adequacy or correspondence of such an understanding to the word of God.

“Scripture is the word of God,” Gadamer writes, “and that means that it has an absolute priority over the teaching of those who interpret it.”\textsuperscript{32} Here Gadamer confesses his own Protestantism. To be sure, he does not state that Scripture has priority over the word of God as it is understood in the Church (a statement clearly unacceptable to Catholics), but only that it has priority over the various ways in which it is interpreted.\textsuperscript{33}

\textsuperscript{29} Ibid., p. 133.

\textsuperscript{30} See above Hans-Georg Gadamer and the Decline of Tradition, esp. the section entitled “Individual Expressivity, Not Content.”

\textsuperscript{31} Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode, p. 184; trans., p. 172.

\textsuperscript{32} “Die Heilige Schrift ist Gottes Wort, und das bedeutet, dass die Schrift vor der Lehre derer, die sie auslegen, einen schlechthinnigen Vorrang behalt.” Ibid., p. 313; trans., p. 295.

\textsuperscript{33} While Gadamer’s statement probably is meant as a repudiation of the claims of the Catholic magisterium, it finds a certain resonance with recent Catholic admissions of the contingency of the forms in which dogma is expressed. Catholics freely concede that, while the form of Church teaching is relative, the form of the Biblical text is without error, at least in matters pertaining to salvation. See the document of the Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, “Mysterium Ecclesiae,” in Acta Apostolicae Sedis 65 (1973): 396-408 (translation: “Declaration in Defense of the Catholic Doctrine on the Church against Certain Errors of the Present Day,” in The Clergy Review 58.
Gadamer’s point is one we have seen earlier. Scripture, like every object of interpretation, should itself guide the interpretation. Catholics can affirm such a thesis as well as Protestants. This being noted, it still must be said that Protestant hermeneutics, not Catholic, is Gadamer’s model for Biblical interpretation. The tradition to which the Protestant interpreter is bound is not, according to Gadamer, the Christian tradition defined in Catholic terms as the teaching of the magisterium. It is rather the Gadamerian effective history, a history which includes the conscious theological presupposition that Scripture is God’s word and other presuppositions, stemming in part from the Christian history to which the interpreter belongs, of which the interpreter can never be fully aware. This effective history relativizes, in Stobbe’s view, the objectivity which the Protestant emphasis on the complete sufficiency of Scripture might promise. Protestant exegesis of a Gadamerian stamp lacks the criteria, Stobbe claims, which Catholic hermeneutics alone affords. These are the criteria provided by the ecclesiastical magisterium, writes Stobbe, which at the Vatican Council of 1870 acknowledged the legitimacy of philosophy and science, despite the fact that many, in the name of philosophy and science, demanded independence from tradition and authority. According to Stobbe, the magisterium’s emphasis on the rights of philosophy and science provides a bulwark against the relativism of Gadamer.

Yet it must be said on Gadamer’s behalf that his treatment of Protestant hermeneutics serves *Truth and Method* less as an example of interpretation in general than of the presence of application in every understanding. The aim is not theological – an argument for Protestantism – but philosophical: an illustration of what always happens in interpretation. Whenever one interprets a text, one applies it to one’s own situation, and Protestant hermeneutics is a good example because it abstracts from the authoritative claim of the magisterium. Stobbe is doubtless correct in his argument that Gadamer’s effective history must be distinguished from the Catholic principle of tradition.\textsuperscript{35} The Catholic principle contains little room for the unconscious working of the past upon the present, and effective history is far more than the unfolding of the event of Jesus Christ. But is Stobbe right to say that Catholic hermeneutics cannot be regarded as a particular application of philosophical hermeneutics, and that the Catholic principle of tradition is not a particular example of effective history?\textsuperscript{36}

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\textsuperscript{34} See the “Dogmatic Constitution Concerning the Catholic Faith” of Vatican I, excerpted in the Enchiridion Symbolorum, esp. paragraphs 1797-1799; trans., *The Sources of Catholic Dogma*, pp. 447-448.

\textsuperscript{35} Stobbe, *Hermeneutik*, p. 166.

\textsuperscript{36} Ibid., pp. 160, 166.
XII.2.B. Interpretation as the Effective History of Tradition

Stobbe makes these allegations on the basis of the difference between tradition and history. A tradition exists in history, he insists, and cannot be baldly equated with it. In Stobbe’s view, the Catholic principle of tradition suggests one way of interpreting the Bible, and the Protestant Scripture principle suggests another way. Both ways belong to history, but only one can be said to represent the Catholic tradition. Stobbe argues that Gadamer fails to appreciate this distinction. When Gadamer asserts, for example, that hermeneutics mediates between an alien history and the historian’s participation in a tradition, Stobbe interprets this as a precipitous fusion of the two. The Catholic principle of tradition, he reiterates, sits in judgment upon the history which the Biblical text embodies. That text has had a Protestant and Catholic effective history. The entirety of that history must be distinguished from Catholic tradition. Even if one believes that the Catholic tradition completes or is materially identical to the Scriptures, Stobbe writes, Catholic hermeneutics must contradict the principle of effective history, “because and insofar as it [Catholic hermeneutics] presupposes and must presuppose that the happening of tradition completes itself in relative independence from that which, in terms of philosophical hermeneutics, can be called the ‘effective history’ of the Scriptures.” The key phrase here is “relative independence.” Stobbe is saying that, while the Catholic tradition may indeed complete the Scriptures, it is not formally identical to them. Scripture and tradition are the media of revelation, but tradition fulfills itself independently – at least in a relative sense – of the effective history of Scripture.

While Stobbe, in the phrase “relative independence,” emphasizes the second term, I would emphasize the first. Although effective history and tradition cannot be equated, they enjoy an independence which is only relative. Stobbe fears that the equation of Catholic tradition and effective history will undercut the authority of the magisterium. If Catholic tradition is no more than one aspect of an effective history which is the totality of the Bible’s impact upon the churches, he implies, then that tradition, embodied in magisterial teachings, offers no more of a criterion for interpretation than any other aspect of the Bible’s effective history. The problem with Stobbe’s argument is that it implicitly reduces the Catholic tradition to what theology calls the proximate rule of faith, i.e., the teachings of the magisterium. He neglects the distinction, which we have seen in connection with Franzelin, between the proximate and remote rules of faith. There are

37 Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode, p. 279; trans., pp. 262-263.

38 „Gleichgültig, ob die katholische Hermeneutik davon ausgeht, die kirchliche Tradition ergänze die Heilige Schrift, oder ob sie beider inhaltliche Identität postuliert, in jedem Fall widerspricht sie dem Prinzip der Wirkungsgeschichte, weil und insofern sie dabei voraussetzt und voraussetzen muss, das Geschehen der Tradition vollziehe sich in relater Unabhängigkeit von dem, was philosophisch-hermeneutisch die ‘Wirkungsgeschichte’ der Heiligen Schrift heisst.” Stobbe, Hermeneutik, p. 166.

39 See above A Reconsideration of the Modern Theology of Tradition, esp. the section entitled “Franzelin’s Insistence on the Remote Rule.”
truths in the remote rule of faith which have not always and everywhere been sufficiently applied through the proximate rule. Tradition cannot be equated with the teachings of the magisterium. Within objective tradition, there are truths which, because the magisterium is not presently or universally teaching them, can be called latent. Is it a violation of the theology of tradition to say that these are an effective part of Christian tradition, present in forms other than that of explicit doctrine, truths which in part escape our conscious awareness?

If it is not a violation, then Stobbe is wrong to state that Catholic hermeneutics must contradict the principle of effective history. Instead it must be said that Catholic hermeneutics, which acknowledges the magisterial right to decide whether a Biblical interpretation contradicts the sense of the Church and how a particular passage ought to be interpreted, is the process of interpreting the entirety of revelation, which the proximate rule of faith does not exhaust. In that interpretation, the effective history of revelation is at work. It brings certain aspects of Christian tradition to conscious awareness, concealing others, and leaving the discrimination between the two in what only can be called the hands of God. Gadamer’s principle of effective history would contradict Catholic hermeneutics if such hermeneutics insisted that the entirety of revelation were fully present in magisterial teaching and that the magisterium were fully conscious of that entirety. Effective history suggests that there is much history the effect of which we are not conscious, and that this is not present, at least not in the Heideggerian sense of being present at hand. But the Catholic theology of tradition does not deny this. It states that there are truths in tradition which the magisterium has not always and everywhere taught. To that extent, the magisterium is not conscious of them. And these truths are not present, therefore, in the proximate rule of faith. Catholic hermeneutics, far from contradicting Gadamer, exemplifies the effective history of Christian tradition.

This positive assessment of Gadamer’s effective history finds a supportive echo in many Catholic interpreters. While not all would go so far as to say that the relation between effective history and the history of the humanities finds an exact parallel in the relation between Catholic tradition and the understanding of faith, the fact that both provide a context for interpretation is generally recognized. The effective history of revelation, whether in the medium of Scripture or of dogma, is the condition for the possibility of interpreting those media. Effective history teaches what Catholics have

40 Franzelin, Part I, th. xxiii, p. 244.

41 This is the position of Leo Scheffczyk, Dogma der Kirche – heute noch versteher? Grundzüge einer dogmatischen Hermeneutik (Berlin: Morus-Verlag, 1973), p. 80. Stobbe (p. 193) criticizes the parallelism which Scheffczyk sees.

long emphasized, namely, that all exegesis is linked to a tradition and furthers it.\textsuperscript{43} Although Gadamer’s doctrine does not provide a criterion for determining true interpretations from false, it does serve to expose the pretension of those who would make exaggerated claims for hermeneutical methods.\textsuperscript{44} The criticism of Stobbe, who refuses to take Gadamer at his word and who maintains that Truth and Method proposes criteria (however relative) for exegesis, finds little support from other Catholic theologians.

Gadamer’s effective history represents a philosophical generalization of what the distinction in Catholic theology between historical and dogmatic tradition conveys. That distinction, which subordinates a documentary idea of tradition to a vital understanding which expresses itself in dogma, suggests that tradition never begins with the application of criteria. No more than a theologian starts from a purely intellectual grasp of religion and proceeds to faith does the one who seeks an understanding of dogma proceed from a documentary history of the dogma’s first-century origins. Instead, one begins by participating in the Christian tradition and refines that tradition by formulating, in an always partial induction, the truth of the dogmas which history has bequeathed to it. So much, we can say, the Gadamerian doctrine suggests. Effective history generalizes the theological dictum by stating that the effect of any historical phenomenon cannot be reduced to a given subjective grasp of it. Rather, one finds in a given understanding the echo of a history which has itself shaped that understanding. That is what Gadamer means when, invoking Hegel, he states that human subjectivity testifies to the historical substance which determines it.\textsuperscript{45} What seems subjective (and therefore a diminution of the fullness of truth) is actually an expression of the truth which no set of criteria can encompass.

Gadamer’s doctrine indirectly adds to the distinction between historical and dogmatically tradition the insight that, not only is dogmatic tradition irreducible to historical tradition, but that it is ultimately irreducible to any criterion whatsoever. The truth of dogma, like the “regula fidei,” can only be verified in terms of itself. To say this, however, seems to plunge theology into the very relativism for which Gadamer has been criticized. Does this not deprive both Scripture and tradition, which are the media of revelation in Catholic theology, of their normative stature? Has not Catholic theology long attested to their sufficiency? What is the sufficiency, formal and material, of the media of revelation? These are the questions of Chapter XIII.


\textsuperscript{44} Hilberath, p. 215.

\textsuperscript{45} Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode, p. 286; trans., p. 269. See above The Philosophical Rehabilitation of Tradition, Chapter 7, esp. the section entitled “The Effect and Our Awareness of It.”